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(LBOs) and corporate takeovers on employment growth and wage growth. Employing both
difference-in-differences combined with propensity score matching and the control function
approach, we ﬁnd evidence that (i) wages remain unchanged after either a private equity
(PE)-backed or non-PE-backed LBO, (ii) wages remain unchanged after an unrelated take-
over and (iii) related takeovers have negative employment consequences, possibly because of
rationalisation. Our evidence does not ﬁnd strong support for intervention in the market for
corporate control on the grounds of protecting employees’ welfare. Copyright © 2013 The
Authors. Managerial and Decision Economics published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.INTRODUCTION
The effect of ownership change on employment and
wages has received relatively little research attention
compared with its effect on performance. This is
surprising given (i) the importance of this issue for
policy-makers concerned with the appropriateness of
intervention in the market for corporate control, (ii)
unions’ concern with protecting their members’ inter-
ests and (iii) practitioners argue that their restructuring
activities are unjustly criticised. This issue has become
of increasing importance because the market for
corporate control has developed beyond traditional
takeovers of one corporation by another to include
leveraged buyout (LBO) acquisitions involvingce to: Nottingham University Business School,
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2013 The Authors. Managerial and Decisispecially created takeover vehicles often backed by
private equity (PE) ﬁrms.
Leveraged buyouts, and mergers and acquisitions
(henceforth takeovers) have received criticism
concerning their impact on employees.1 The most se-
vere criticism has most recently been directed towards
PE-backed LBOs because of union concerns that PE
investors gain at employees’ expense. Unions argue
that employees suffer via layoffs and lower wages
(International Trade Union Confederation, 2007). This
has led to wider public debate on the role of LBOs and
PE within the economy (see, for example, the Trea-
sury Select Committee, 2007).
The impact of takeovers on jobs and wages has been
a controversial issue for several decades. The seminal
work of Shleifer and Summers (1988) argues that own-
ership change via acquisition creates the opportunity for
management to breach implicit and explicit agreements
with employees, leading to job losses and lower wage
payments. Proponents of the market for corporate con-
trol, however, argue that the takeover is a means of
shifting stewardship of corporate assets to those thaton Economics published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
K. AMESS ET AL.162can best utilise them (Manne, 1965). In addition, the
takeover is an important discipline of last resort when
other corporate governance devices, such as the Board
of Directors, have failed to curtail managerial inefﬁcien-
cies. Such arguments have also been employed to de-
fend PE involvement in the LBO of publicly quoted
companies (Jensen, 1986), that is, the LBO wrests con-
trol of corporate resources from under-performing man-
agement and ownership structures.
The debates outlined earlier raise important ques-
tions about the market for corporate control and any
policy intervention in this market. Should policy-
makers intervene to protect employees’ interests dur-
ing ownership change? In order to address this ques-
tion, we must ﬁrst address the question: what are the
wage and employment consequences for employees?
This is an empirical question, and if there are no sig-
niﬁcant consequences for employees, there is no basis
for policy intervention in the market for corporate con-
trol in order to protect them.
Studies have sought to provide systematic evidence
for the labour consequences of takeovers (e.g. Conyon
et al., 2001, 2002, 2004) and LBOs (e.g. Lichtenberg
and Siegel, 1990; Amess and Wright, 2007: Davis
et al., 2008). Until now, however, LBOs and takeovers
have been analysed separately in distinct strands of the
corporate restructuring literature. From an empirical
perspective, this is problematic because the identiﬁca-
tion of the effects of ownership change is not carried
out within a uniﬁed framework. From a policy perspec-
tive, separate analysis of takeovers and LBOs is
unhelpful. Policy intervention in the market for corpo-
rate control could be misplaced without a comparison
of the labour consequences of different types of owner-
ship change within a uniﬁed framework.
Davis et al. (2008) examine the employment effects
of only PE-backed LBOs compared with a control
group. The current paper seeks to isolate the labour con-
sequences of PE involvement in LBOs by examining
both PE-backed and non-PE-backed LBOs. This is a
unique feature of the current paper that allows system-
atic analysis of the employment and wage consequences
of PE and LBOs that hitherto has not been conducted. In
addition, we follow the takeover literature by separately
analysing the consequences of related and unrelated
takeovers (e.g. Conyon et al., 2002). Note, as PE inves-
tors are ﬁnancial acquirers running each LBO purchase
as a separate entity with its own ﬁnancial structure, all
LBO purchases are unrelated.
The paper is organised as follows. The section on
Literature Review and Theoretical Background exam-
ines the hypothesised relationships between the differentCopyright © 2013 The Authors.
Managerial and Decision Economics published by Johntypes of ownership change, and employment andwages.
The section on Data describes the data and sources. The
section on Modelling Frameworks outlines the control
function approach, which is the empirical modelling
approach employed in the paper. Then we have the
Results section and ﬁnally, the Conclusions section.LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL
BACKGROUND
The motivation for ownership change impacts on
theoretical predictions concerning employment and
wage consequences. The market for corporate control
is typically characterised as a natural selection process
whereby under-performing ﬁrms are targeted for
ownership change. Indeed, takeovers are considered
the ultimate sanction against under-performingmanagers
when internal control devices are ineffective. The
counter-argument is that an acquisition might be a
consequence of acquiring ﬁrms’ weak corporate gover-
nance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). LBOs do not suffer
from this problem and might therefore be considered
a superior disciplinary device to under-performing
management compared with takeover by another ﬁrm
(Weir and Wright, 2006).
Takeovers
Proﬁt-maximising managers conducting related take-
overs are more likely to be seeking cost savings,
which can potentially be achieved by the elimination
of duplicated activities. Such cost savings can mani-
fest in job losses. In addition, such ownership change
creates an opportunity for new management to renege
on implicit contracts with employees and reduce their
extra-marginal wage payments (Shleifer and Summers,
1988). Dutz (1989) argues that horizontally related
takeovers might also occur in mature and declining
industries in order to remove excess capacity in the
industry. This can result in plant closures, which in
turn leads to job losses. Horn and Wolinsky (1988)
show that horizontally related takeovers can change
industry structure that strengthens bargaining power
post-acquisition, due to a change in industry structure,
which improves proﬁts. Depending on their bargaining
power, workers may share in the additional revenues
generated post-acquisition.
If unrelated takeovers arise because of weak corpo-
rate governance that does not motivate managers to
disgorge free cash ﬂow (Jensen, 1986), there is no pre-
diction of job losses. Indeed, the acquisition might beWiley & Sons, Ltd.
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expanding the size of the ﬁrm and the number of em-
ployees under their control (Williamson, 1964). Such
under-performing management are not likely to be
seeking to cut costs via wage reductions. In contrast,
unrelated takeovers might arise in a market for
corporate control that removes under-performing man-
agement subsequent to ownership change (Manne,
1965). If pre-acquisition management pursued their
own non-proﬁt-maximising objectives and employed
sub-optimally high levels of employees in a manner
suggested by Williamson (1964), a proﬁt-maximising
acquisition would result in job losses. Moreover, own-
ership change via acquisition would provide manage-
ment with the opportunity to reduce extra-marginal
wage payments (Shleifer and Summers, 1988).
Evidence on the employment consequences of
takeovers is mixed. Brown and Medoff (1988) provide
early US evidence ﬁnding that takeovers are associ-
ated with a small increase in employment. More
recently, McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) report that
acquired plants increase their employment rates by
about 3% per year faster than non-acquired plants.
They also suggest beneﬁts for employees arising from
acquired ﬁrms being less likely to close plants than
non-acquired ﬁrms. In contrast to US evidence, UK
studies depict negative employment consequences
following an acquisition. Conyon et al. (2002) ﬁnd that
related takeovers are associated with 19% lower em-
ployment, whereas unrelated takeovers are associated
with about 8% lower employment in the year of the
transaction. The expected effects of unrelated acquisi-
tions on employment are ambiguous but are expected
to at least be less negative than for related acquisitions.
Evidence on the wage consequences of takeovers
consistently indicates that takeovers are associated
with wage increases. McGuckin and Nguyen (2001)
report US evidence indicating that wages increase by
an average of about 3% per annum. Conyon et al.
(2004) ﬁnd UK evidence of wages being 14% higher
2 years after related takeovers, which contrasts with
unrelated takeovers having no signiﬁcant effect. They
suggest that this reﬂects higher labour productivity af-
ter related takeovers. An alternative explanation, how-
ever, is that higher wages and labour productivity are
due to a ‘batting average’ effect. This is where low
productivity workers lose their jobs after takeovers
resulting in higher average productivity and wages of
the remaining workers. Hence, we expect related
acquisitions to result in wage increases as a result of
efﬁciency gains from synergies, whereas unrelated
acquisitions are expected to have no effect on wages.Copyright © 2013 The Authors.
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The LBOs install a governance structure that reduces
managers’ opportunistic behaviour and induces them to
increase effort (Elitzur et al., 1998). First, increased debt
increases ﬁrms’ ﬁxed interest obligations, which provides
managers with incentives to generate cash to service the
debt (Thompson et al., 1992) and to reduce sub-optimal
investments, and re-direct this cash towards servicing
the debt (Fox and Marcus, 1992). Thus, there is debt
bonding. Second, managers are incentivised by the con-
centration of equity in their possession to reduce
organisational slack in the post-buyout ﬁrm (Thompson
andWright, 1995).Managers’ increased equity stake also
induces them to increase their effort (Elitzur et al., 1998).
Finally, PE investors typically have Board representation,
often nominate the Chair of the Board and have greater
access to information regarding ﬁrm performance
compared with shareholders of public corporations.2 This
places them in a strong position to monitor senior
management’s decisions and the performance of the ﬁrm.
The previous discussion therefore suggests that the
LBO governance structure provides managers with in-
centives to reduce labour costs. If pre-buyout ﬁrms in-
dulged in sub-optimally high levels of employment
and made extra-marginal wage payments due to weak
corporate governance, LBOs provide managers with
incentives to reduce levels of employment and wage
payments post-buyout. Thus, the change in pre-buyout
and post-buyout employment and wages is negative.
The arguments outlined previously have been
largely advanced in respect of buyouts of listed corpo-
rations (Thompson and Wright, 1995), but these
account for only a minority of PE and buyout deals.
An alternative argument is that pre-ownership change,
managers in buyouts may have been prevented from
pursuing growth opportunities because of restrictive
control by the parent, in the case of divisional buyouts,
or disinterested owners in the case of buyouts of
private family ﬁrms. Besides monitoring skills and
their provision of funds, PE ﬁrms may also provide
expertise that helps enhance the exploitation of growth
opportunities through their strategic knowledge of
markets (Meuleman et al., 2009). As such, LBOs
and PE backing could result in employment growth.
The ownership change still, however, provides an
opportunity to reduce extra-marginal wage payments,
if they existed prior to the buyout.
Evidence in the LBO literature is mixed with
respect to both wage and employment consequences.
Kaplan (1989) found a 12% decline in median
employment in the year after a management buyoutWiley & Sons, Ltd.
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effects, but these studies focused on buyouts of listed
corporations. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) added
further insight by ﬁnding that production worker em-
ployment was not affected by an LBO; however, they
found that non-production worker employment
declined by 8.5% 2 years after the transaction. Amess
and Wright (2007) provided the ﬁrst direct comparison
of insider-led MBOs and outsider-led management
buy-ins (MBIs). They found that MBOs and MBIs
had 0.51% faster and 0.81% slower employment
growth than the control sample, respectively. How-
ever, Amess and Wright (2007) did not distinguish
PE and non-PE-backed deals. Cressy et al. (2011),
also using UK data, ﬁnd that employment in PE-
backed buyouts falls relative to their control group of
non-PE-backed companies for the ﬁrst 4 years post-
buyout but rises in the ﬁfth year. They suggest that
initial rationalisation creates the basis for more viable
job creation.
Davis et al. (2008), using a sample of PE-backed
buyouts in the US, report that cumulative employment
growth in the 2 years prior to a transaction is 4% slower
than that for the control. In addition, employment
shrinks more rapidly in the ﬁrst 2 years post-buyout with
employment being 7% lower than that for control ﬁrms.
However, 6% more ‘greenﬁeld’ job creation occurs in
PE-backed buyouts compared with the control group.
Overall, the ﬁndings suggest PE ﬁrms are catalysts for
creative destruction. Evidence from France (Boucly
et al., 2009) demonstrates increases in employment in
PE-backed buyouts relative to a control group.
With respect to the wage effects of LBOs,
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) report US evidence
indicating that the principal negative impact is on
non-production workers. They report that the hourly
compensation of production workers increases by
3.6% and 2.3% in each of the ﬁrst 2 years post-buyout.
For UK MBOs and MBIs, Amess and Wright (2007)
ﬁnd that they both have slightly slower rates of wage
growth compared with their control sample.
We seek to contribute to the literature on the conse-
quences of organisational change by determining and
quantifying differences in the effects of LBOs and
takeovers on employment and wages. We examine
four different types of ownership change (PE-backed
LBOs, non-PE-backed LBOs, related takeovers and
unrelated takeovers) within a uniﬁed empirical frame-
work. The discussion in this section suggests that the
employment effects of related takeovers are expected
to be most negative and PE-backed buyouts most pos-
itive, with unrelated takeovers and non-PE-backedCopyright © 2013 The Authors.
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ous discussion also suggests, in contrast, that related
acquisitions are likely to be associated with the largest
positive effect on wages.DATA
The sample is constructed from three sources: the
Centre for Management Buy-Out Research (CMBOR)
database, Zephyr and Financial Analysis Made Easy
(FAME). We obtain from the FAME employment,
wage, ﬁrm age and turnover data covering the period
1996–2006.
The CMBOR database includes the name of all
ﬁrms that adopted the LBO governance structure with-
out an upper or lower size cut-off, the year in which
the LBO governance structure was adopted, whether
the LBO was PE-backed and the year in which the
ﬁrm ceased to have the LBO governance structure.
The database enables LBOs to be distinguished into
those that are PE-backed and those that do not use
PE ﬁnance. After matching the CMBOR and FAME
data and cleaning the data to remove ﬁrms subject to
multiple ownership change, we obtain 253 LBOs,
133 of which are PE-backed.
The Zephyr database was used to obtain informa-
tion on takeovers. We label a deal an acquisition when
the acquiring ﬁrm attains a minimum 50% ownership
stake in the target ﬁrm. If the acquirer held a minority
stake and subsequently increased its stake to at least
50%, this is also classed as an acquisition. After
matching Zephyr and FAME data and cleaning the
data to remove ﬁrms subject to multiple ownership
change, we obtain 274 takeovers. In total, we observe
527 ﬁrms subject to ownership change.
We remove ﬁrms subject to more than one owner-
ship change in order to obtain clear measures of the
impact of ownership change. The control function ap-
proach removes selection bias, and therefore, results
are interpreted as causal. If a ﬁrm is subject to more than
one ownership change, the causal relationship between
the ownership changes and outcomes becomes prob-
lematic to determine. In the construction of our sample
of ﬁrms treated to ownership change, we are careful to
exclude ﬁrms that indulge in acquisition and divestment
after the ownership change. This is important in
distinguishing between organic and non-organic em-
ployment growth, which are conﬂated in many studies.
Indeed, in our data, we observe only organic growth.
Our control sample consists of ﬁrms that experi-
enced no ownership change during the period underWiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Table 2. Growth Rates (from t 1 to t+ 1) of the
Variables of Interest
Variable Mean S. D. Min Max
Control
Employment 0.14 0.48 6.30 7.17
Wage 0.11 0.35 7.34 4.67
Productivity 0.07 0.54 8.48 8.33
PE-backed LBO
Employment 0.11 0.39 2.91 1.61
Wage 0.07 0.28 1.20 1.12
Productivity 0.05 0.32 0.93 1.91
Non-PE-backed LBO
Employment 0.04 0.49 3.08 1.32
Wage 0.10 0.35 2.74 0.84
Productivity 0.07 0.48 1.03 3.56
Related acquisition
Employment 0.12 1.02 5.36 3.02
Wage 0.14 0.59 2.73 2.26
Productivity 0.06 0.80 2.83 2.38
Unrelated acquisition
Employment 0.12 1.05 4.92 3.47
Wage 0.05 0.49 2.61 1.94
Productivity 0.10 0.62 3.09 2.08
PE, private equity; LBO, leveraged buyout.
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FAME reported the required accounting data, we re-
moved ﬁrms where a minority stake had been taken
during the sample period, resulting in a control sample
that contains 27 029 observations.
Sample characteristics are reported in Table 1. The
productivity variable is labour productivity, measured
as the ratio of turnover to number of employees. For
ﬁrms subject to ownership change, ﬁrm characteristics
in the year prior to ownership change are reported. For
the control sample, the characteristics of ﬁrms when
they are ﬁrst observed in the data set are reported.
Table 1 illustrates that there are differences in charac-
teristics between those ﬁrms subject to ownership
change and the control sample. There are also differ-
ences in characteristics between ﬁrms subject to differ-
ent types of ownership change.
Growth rates for the different types of ownership
change over the period t 1 to t+ 1 (where t is the year
of ownership change) are reported in Table 2.3
Differences in these are ‘raw’ growth rates observed in
the data for ﬁrms subject to different types of ownership
change. Employing two techniques, difference-in-
differences combined with propensity score matching
and the control function approach, a systematic analysis
of wage and employment growth is conducted.MODELLING FRAMEWORKS
A fundamental problem when analysing the conse-
quences of ownership change is in establishing the
counterfactual (Smart and Waldfogel, 1994). Firms that
experience ownership change are not randomly selected
from the population of ﬁrms. For instance, ﬁrms might
be subject to ownership change because they over-
employ and/or make extra-marginal wage payments that
are identiﬁed as sources of organisational inefﬁciency.
Therefore, the ownership change decision could be
correlated with the levels of employment and wagesTable 1. Sample Characteristics (a Year before Ow
Control PE-backed LBO
Variable Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Log number of employees 3.80 1.53 4.95 1.31
Log wage 3.18 0.69 3.10 0.51
Log productivity 4.85 1.21 4.55 0.83
Age 16.06 19.25 22.19 19.47
Obs. 27 029 149
PE, private equity; LBO, leveraged buyout.
Copyright © 2013 The Authors.
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to ownership change.
To address the issue of self-selection, we use two dif-
ferent modelling strategies and compare their estimates
of the Average Treatment Effects of ownership change.
First, outlined in the section on Propensity Score
Matching Combined with Difference-in-Differences is
a modelling strategy that combines propensity score
matching (to construct the counterfactual) with a
difference-in-differences analysis. By using this
approach, it is possible to determine and quantify a
causal relationship between ownership change, and
employment and wages. Second, outlined in the sec-
tion on The Control Function Approach is a model-
ling strategy that incorporates a control function into
a regression to control for selection bias. By adding
sufﬁcient control variables to the control function,
we are able to obtain unbiased estimates to determinenership Change)
Non-PE-backed
LBO
Related
acquisition
Unrelated
acquisition
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
4.20 1.04 4.96 1.65 4.51 1.47
3.27 0.53 3.25 0.96 3.39 0.54
4.93 1.06 4.74 1.16 4.86 0.99
22.82 20.63 22.91 27.23 17.80 17.70
104 110 164
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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change, and employment and wages.Propensity Score Matching Combined with
Difference-in-Differences
In this paper, each ﬁrm can be thought of as being
under any of three treatments or schemes, that is, no
restructuring, LBO and acquisition, denoted as S0, S1
and S2, respectively. We denote the status of ﬁrm i
as Sji ¼ 0 or Sji ¼ 1, for j= 0, 1, 2. Thus, for example,
S1i ¼ 1 indicates that ﬁrm i has undergone a LBO.
We denote the potential outcomes associated to each
of the three treatments as yi0, yi1 and yi2, where y
denotes either employment or wages. The problem is
estimating the causal effect of one treatment j relative
to another treatment k,
δjk ¼ yijijyik: (1)
As each ﬁrm receives only one of the treatments
and the remaining two potential outcomes are
unobserved, the problem of estimating δjk is tanta-
mount to estimating missing data. Thus, to make the
problem tractable, we concentrate on identifying the
average effect of treatment Sj relative to treatment Sk,
Δjk ¼ E yij  yikjSji ¼ 1
 
¼ E yijjSji ¼ 1
  E yikjSji ¼ 1  (2)
Causal inference relies on the construction of the
counterfactual for the last term in equation (2), which
is the outcome participants of treatment Sk would have
experienced, on average, if they had participated in
treatment Sj. This is estimated by the corresponding
average value of the outcome variable for the partici-
pants of treatment Sk
E yik δik ¼ 1g:jf (3)
An important feature in the accurate construction of
the counterfactual is the selection of a valid group of
ﬁrms with which to estimate expression (3). In this re-
spect, any estimation method has to overcome the
problem of selection bias. In our case, ﬁrms that are
targets for LBOs and acquisitions are likely to have
different characteristics than ﬁrms that experienced
no restructuring. The approach we take here is to em-
ploy propensity matching techniques originally pro-
posed for the binary treatment case by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) and extended to the multiple treat-
ments case by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001).
The method of matching seeks to control for all those
observable variables that are responsible for selectionCopyright © 2013 The Authors.
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characteristics that are hypothesised to impact on the
probability of a ﬁrm being subject to an LBO or acqui-
sition. These are the pre-structuring levels of employ-
ment, wages, productivity, age and time trend.
The fundamental assumption of the method of
matching is that conditional on X, the distribution of
the counterfactual outcome yik in the group receiving
treatment Sj is the same as the observed distribution
of yik in the group receiving treatment S
k. In this case,
the average outcome of the matched ﬁrms in non-
treated cases constitutes the correct sample counterpart
for the missing information on the outcomes that the
treated would have experienced, on average, if they
had not been treated. This assumption therefore en-
sures that the counterfactual is accurately estimated
using data from suitable ﬁrms that have not received
the relevant treatment.
Under this assumption, matching based on the pro-
pensity score ensures the balancing of the observable
characteristics X in the two groups that are being com-
pared (i.e. j and k). The propensity score for i, Pijk, is
deﬁned as the probability of receiving treatment Sj rel-
ative to the probability of receiving treatment Sk.
Pijk ¼
P Sji ¼ 1jX
 
P Ski ¼ 1 XÞj
 (4)
where the probabilities are predicted from a multino-
mial probit regression.
In general, the matching estimator of the causal effect
of treatment S j relative to treatment Sk can be written as
Δ^jk ¼ ∑
l∈Sj
yl  ∑
i∈Sk
g Pijk
 
yi
 !
(5)
where g(.) is a function assigning the weights to be
placed on the comparison ﬁrms in treatment group Sk
used as matches for participant of treatment Sj.
When there are repeated observations for the same
set of participants over time (indexed by t), it is argu-
ably more reliable to base the evaluation analysis on
the difference between the variable of interest s year
after the treatment period (viz. yit + s) and its pre-treat-
ment value (viz. yit 1), that is, Δyit+ s= yt+ s yt 1
(e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). In this case,
the combined differences-in-differences and matching
estimator is deﬁned as
Δ^jk ¼ ∑
l∈Sj
Δyltþs  ∑
i∈Sk
g Pijk
 
Δyitþs
 !
(6)Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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effects of restructuring at the year of restructuring
and the ﬁrst three post-restructuring years, that is, for
s= 0,1…4. Throughout, we impose the so-called com-
mon support condition in the matching algorithm. This
involves dropping ﬁrms belonging to treatment group
Sj whose propensity score is higher than the maximum
or less than the minimum propensity score of ﬁrms in
the comparison group Sk.
The different matching estimators proposed in the
literature (such as the nearest neighbours and kernel
estimators) differ from each other in the choice of
the weighting function they employ. However, they
share the same property of being consistent estimators
of the treatment effect under consideration, although
they can exhibit substantial small sample differences.
In this paper, we focus on the (three) nearest
neighbours matching estimators, but we also have
experimented with different weighting schemes.Table 3. Estimates from Multinomial Probit
Regressions of the Determinants of Ownership
Change
Coefﬁcient
No change
vs LBO
No change vs
acquisition
Employment 0.185*** 0.285***
(0.018) (0.027)
Wage 0.187*** 0.082
(0.054) (0.078)
Productivity 0.007 0.064
(0.031) (0.039)
Age 0.004** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002)
Time trend 0.012 0.312***
(0.019) (0.021)
Log likelihood 2250.586
Observations 23 914
p-value from joint test of
signiﬁcance of covariates
0.000
t-statistics reported in parentheses. LBO, leveraged buyout. ***p< 0.01,
**p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.The Control Function Approach
The basic idea behind the control function approach
lies in adding a ﬂexible function of the pre-treatment
variables x, say h(x), to a regression of the outcome
variable (y) on the treatment indicators variable (w),
to control for possible selection bias. As explained
by Wooldridge (2002, pp. 612–614), putting enough
control variables in x would render the treatment vari-
ables and the unobservables affecting the outcome
variables uncorrelated. In this case, ordinary least
squares regression of y on w and h(x) would deliver
unbiased and consistent estimators of the treatment
effects.
In our empirical model, y denotes employment or
wage growth; the treatment indicator variable w con-
sists of four dummy variables indicating related and
unrelated takeovers, and PE and non-PE-backed
LBOs; and x consists of the pre-treatment period
values of ﬁrm employment, wage, age and productiv-
ity. The function h(x) is formed by interacting w with
x x, that is, by multiplying each dummy treatment
variable by the demeaned value of x using the sample
average. In the ﬁnal analysis, the following equation is
estimated:
y ¼ δþ αwþ xβ þ δ x xð Þ þ ε (7)
where ε is a possibly heteroskedastic error term.
In the previous equation, the coefﬁcient α gives the
average treatment effect of the various treatment vari-
ables under consideration. A major advantage of the
control function approach is that it allows one to studyCopyright © 2013 The Authors.
Managerial and Decision Economics published by Johnhow the average treatment effects vary across various
levels of the pre-treatment control variables. Such
heterogeneous effects can easily be obtained from
the regression coefﬁcients as
ATE xð Þ ¼ αþ δ x xð Þ (8)RESULTS
Propensity Score Matching Combined with
Difference-in-Differences
The results from the multinomial probit regression of
the determinants of corporate restructuring are
reported in Table 3. We ﬁnd that larger and older ﬁrms
are likely to be acquisition and LBO targets. Although
the analysis of the determinants of restructuring is
interesting in its own right, as far as the matching
method is concerned, the only crucial issue is ensuring
that the propensity score obtained from the regression
is successful in controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc differ-
ences in the pre-ownership change period. It is there-
fore important to test whether the covariates in the
multinomial probit regression (employment, wages,
productivity, age and trend) are balanced in all treat-
ment pairs of interest. Accordingly, for each covariate
in the multinomial probit regression, we test for equal-
ity of means across treatment pairs by using standard
t-tests. These tests are reported in Table 4 and show
the success of the propensity score matching, provid-
ing support for the validity of our approach.Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Table 4. Balancing Tests of Matched Samples
No change vs LBO No change vs acquisition LBO vs acquisition
Mean
p-value
Mean
p-value
Mean
p-valueSample Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Employment
Unmatched 4.6273 3.8392 0 4.6273 4.7316 0.44 4.6273 4.7316 0.44
Matched 4.6273 4.5876 0.623 4.6606 4.4812 0.322 4.6606 4.4812 0.322
Wages
Unmatched 3.1634 3.1604 0.947 3.1634 3.3053 0.022 3.1634 3.3053 0.022
Matched 3.1634 3.1634 0.999 3.1629 3.1334 0.6 3.1629 3.1334 0.6
Productivity
Unmatched 4.7086 4.8376 0.102 4.7086 4.7977 0.349 4.7086 4.7977 0.349
Matched 4.7086 4.6032 0.114 4.6991 4.5709 0.166 4.6991 4.5709 0.166
Age
Unmatched 22.448 16.653 0 22.448 19.214 0.098 22.448 19.214 0.098
Matched 22.448 21.448 0.473 22.916 23.04 0.813 22.916 23.04 0.813
Time trend
Unmatched 1998.5 1999 0.002 1998.5 2002.2 0 1998.5 2002.2 0
Matched 1998.5 1998.4 0.377 1998.6 1998.7 0.617 1998.6 1998.7 0.617
LBO, leveraged buyout.
able 5. The Impact of LBOs and Takeovers on Employment and Wages
Employment Wages
No. of
treated ﬁrmsCoefﬁcient t-statistics Coefﬁcient t-statistics
BO
t+ 1 0.0450091 (1.69)* 0.0025622 (0.14) 232
t+ 2 0.0503943 (1.43) 0.0021533 (0.08) 222
cquisition
t+ 1 0.1709787 (2.74)*** 0.1128092 (2.41)*** 215
t+ 2 0.235025 (2.87)*** 0.0309588 (0.56) 133
bsolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. t 1 is the base year. LBOs, leveraged buyouts. ***p< 0.01; **p< 0.05; *p< 0.1.
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ATable 6. The Impact of PE-Backed LBOs, Non-Private PE LBOs, Related Takeovers and Unrelated
Takeovers on Employment and Wages
Employment Wages
No. of
treated ﬁrmsCoefﬁcient t-statistics Coefﬁcient t-statistics
PE-backed LBO
t + 1 0.016 0.592 0.023 0.764 133
t + 2 0.034 0.687 0.004 0.08 130
Non-PE-backed LBO
t + 1 0.11*** 2.336 0.01 0.401 99
t + 2 0.091 1.134 0.002 0.031 92
Related takeover
t + 1 0.158* 1.854 0.197*** 2.457 70
t + 2 0.254 1.579 0.136 1.506 44
Unrelated takeover
t + 1 0.155*** 2.053 0.062 1.333 139
t + 2 0.201 1.347 0.083 1.524 88
Absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. t 1 is the base year. PE, private equity; LBO, leveraged buyout. ***p< 0.01; **p< 0.05;
*p< 0.1.
Copyright © 2013 The Authors.
Managerial and Decision Economics published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 35: 161–171 (2014)
THE WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT CONSEQUENCES OF OWNERSHIP CHANGE 169Table 5 reports ﬁndings for LBOs and acquisitions
per se. We ﬁnd evidence, at the 10% level, of a 4%Table 7. Results Using the Control Function Appro
Employm
t + 1
Average treatment effects
PE-backed LBO 0.081
(0.0428)
Non-PE-backed LBO 0.028
(0.0446)
Related takeover 0.414**
(0.1398)
Unrelated takeover 0.177
(0.1212)
Control variables
Number of employees 0.059***
(0.0028)
Wage 0.029***
(0.0066)
Productivity 0.004
(0.0040)
Age 0.002***
(0.0002)
PE LBO* employees 0.060
(0.0511)
Non-PE LBO* employees 0.095
(0.0735)
Related takeover* employees 0.100
(0.0833)
Unrelated takeover* employees 0.186
(0.1041)
PE LBO* wage 0.023
(0.1122)
Non-PE LBO* wage 0.119
(0.1146)
Related takeover* wage 0.028
(0.2504)
Unrelated takeover* wage 0.002
(0.1947)
PE LBO* productivity 0.042
(0.0475)
Non-PE LBO* Productivity 0.043
(0.0559)
Related takeover* Productivity 0.169
(0.1151)
Unrelated takeover* Productivity 0.059
(0.1550)
PE LBO* Age 0.000
(0.0018)
Non-PE LBO* Age 0.002
(0.0026)
Related takeover* Age 0.004
(0.0032)
Unrelated takeover* Age 0.021**
(0.0080)
Constant 0.416***
(0.1050)
Observations 22 179
Adjusted R-squared 0.059
All control variables refer to the pre-ownership change period; robust s
time dummies. PE, private equity; LBO, leveraged buyout. *Signiﬁcan
Copyright © 2013 The Authors.
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LBOs have no statistically signiﬁcant impact on post-ach
ent Wages
t+ 2 t+ 1 t + 2
0.093* 0.011 0.063
(0.0459) (0.0268) (0.0332)
0.039 0.036 0.020
(0.0531) (0.0492) (0.0507)
0.265 0.065 0.156
(0.1527) (0.0850) (0.1189)
0.093 0.022 0.048
(0.1515) (0.0754) (0.0576)
0.079*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0022)
0.031*** 0.155*** 0.182***
(0.0083) (0.0078) (0.0082)
0.002 0.013*** 0.015***
(0.0051) (0.0030) (0.0031)
0.003*** 0.000** 0.000***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.047 0.020 0.010
(0.0534) (0.0183) (0.0237)
0.071 0.065 0.074
(0.0809) (0.0577) (0.0592)
0.156* 0.008 0.115
(0.0677) (0.0412) (0.0720)
0.289* 0.014 0.024
(0.1258) (0.0555) (0.0527)
0.013 0.120 0.161
(0.1226) (0.0884) (0.0858)
0.174 0.083 0.130
(0.1330) (0.0712) (0.1140)
0.058 0.213 0.530***
(0.0874) (0.1282) (0.1464)
0.336 0.046 0.218**
(0.1994) (0.1027) (0.0792)
0.055 0.009 0.025
(0.0505) (0.0239) (0.0284)
0.044 0.061 0.002
(0.0549) (0.0734) (0.0626)
0.055 0.010 0.033
(0.1014) (0.0530) (0.0681)
0.091 0.002 0.045
(0.1813) (0.0745) (0.0793)
0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0009)
0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0016)
0.001 0.003 0.004
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0030)
0.020* 0.004 0.004
(0.0086) (0.0029) (0.0026)
0.564*** 0.473*** 0.339
(0.1097) (0.0964) (0.3458)
20 466 22 176 20 465
0.067 0.075 0.100
tandard errors in parentheses; all speciﬁcations include the full set of
t at 10%; **Signiﬁcant at 5%; ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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K. AMESS ET AL.170buyout wages. It is clear from Table 5 that acquisitions
have a more pronounced impact on employment and
wages than LBOs. Employment is about 17% and
23% lower in the ﬁrst 2 years post-acquisition, respec-
tively. In contrast, wages are about 11% higher in the
ﬁrst year post-acquisition.
There is increasing concern about the impact of PE
ﬁrms in the economy (International Trade Union Con-
federation, 2007; Treasury Select Committee, 2007).
In order to isolate the consequences of PE, we disag-
gregate LBOs into PE-backed and non-PE-backed
LBOs. Results of the subsequent analysis are reported
in Table 6. We ﬁnd no evidence that PE-backed LBOs
have a signiﬁcant impact on either employment or
wages. In contrast, there is evidence non-PE-backed
LBOs have 11% lower employment in the year after
the LBO. Non-PE-backed LBOs have no signiﬁcant
impact on wages, however.
Results reported in Table 6 also distinguish between
related and unrelated takeovers. We deﬁne related take-
overs as those occurring in the same three-digit SIC
code. The results in Table 6 show that both unrelated
and related acquisitions lead to about 16% decline in
unemployment in the year after the transaction; how-
ever, this is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level for related
takeovers. Wages are about 20% higher in the year
following a related acquisition; however, unrelated
acquisitions have no signiﬁcant impact on wages.The Control Function Approach
Results using the control function approach outlined
in the section on The Control Function Approach
are reported in Table 7. Coefﬁcient estimates are
average treatment effects indicating the change in
employment and wages, respectively, compared with
the year prior to the transaction. There is evidence
that employment is about 9% higher 2 years after a
PE-backed LBO, signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Otherwise, there is no evidence that LBOs, whether
PE-backed or not, have any signiﬁcant effect on
employment and wages. Results for the employment
effects of related takeovers are supportive of those
reported in the section on Propensity Score Matching
Combined with Difference-in-Differences; however,
the coefﬁcient estimate indicates quite a large decline
in employment of about 41% in the year after the
transaction. The remaining results indicate related
takeovers have no effect on wages and unrelated
takeovers have no signiﬁcant effect on either employ-
ment or wages.Copyright © 2013 The Authors.
Managerial and Decision Economics published by JohnCONCLUSIONS
Ownership change via LBO or takeover has received
criticism for their negative effect on employment and
wages. Indeed, critics have suggested there should be
intervention in the market for corporate control in or-
der to protect the welfare of employees. Intervention
to protect employees’ welfare is likely to affect the ef-
ﬁciency of the market for corporate control. It is there-
fore important to establish through systematic analysis
the consequences for employees of ownership change.
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the
effects of ownership change via LBO and takeover
on wages and employment using two methods: differ-
ences-in-differences combined with propensity score
matching and the control function approach. We use
two methods in order to examine the robustness of
ﬁndings to the method employed. In order to examine
the controversial effects of PE, the empirical analyses
distinguish between LBOs that have PE backing and
those that are conducted without PE. This is the ﬁrst
study to make such a comparison. The paper also dis-
tinguishes between related and unrelated takeovers.
Four key ﬁndings emerge irrespective of the
method employed. First, LBOs with PE backing have
no signiﬁcant impact on wage levels. Second, non-
PE-backed LBOs have no signiﬁcant impact on
wages. Both these ﬁndings accord with Lichtenberg
and Siegel’s (1990) US study that reports that the
wages of blue-collar workers remain unchanged.
Third, unrelated takeovers have no signiﬁcant effect
on wages, which supports the ﬁndings of Conyon
et al. (2004). Finally, related takeovers have a negative
effect on employment, supporting the ﬁndings of
Conyon et al. (2002).
Using difference-in-differences combined with
propensity score matching, we also ﬁnd that non-
PE-backed LBOs have negative employment conse-
quences. In addition, in accordance with Conyon
et al. (2004) and McGuckin and Nguyen (2001), there
is evidence that related takeovers have a positive im-
pact on wages. Using the control function approach,
we ﬁnd that there is weak evidence of higher employ-
ment after a PE-backed LBO. This contrasts with
Davis et al. (2008) who ﬁnd that PE-backed LBOs in
the US have a small negative impact on employment
levels.
Should policy-makers intervene to protect em-
ployees’ interests during ownership change? We argue
that our results suggest not. Although related take-
overs result in negative employment effects, this could
be due to rationalisation and a reduction in excessWiley & Sons, Ltd.
Manage. Decis. Econ. 35: 161–171 (2014)
THE WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT CONSEQUENCES OF OWNERSHIP CHANGE 171capacity. The activities of PE ﬁrms have received partic-
ular criticism (International Trade Union Confederation,
2007) and have been under scrutiny (Treasury Select
Committee, 2007); our results provide no support for
government intervention in order to protect the jobs
and wages of employees of ﬁrms subject to an LBO.NOTES
1. LBOs are typically characterised by (i) an increased
concentration of ﬁrms’ equity held by managers, (ii) an
increase in leverage with the ﬁrm taking on a large
amount of debt secured against future cash ﬂows and/or
secured against ﬁrms’ assets and (iii) active involvement
in monitoring at board level by private equity funds when
they ﬁnance an LBO.
2. This arises as ﬁnanciers are able to negotiate contractual
conditions in the shareholders’ agreement providing for
such disclosure.
3. For the control sample of ﬁrms, growth rates over the ﬁrst
3 years for which ﬁrms are observed are reported.REFERENCES
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